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CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION
IN ISRAEL:
THE TRANSFORMATION
OF TRADITION
Elihu Katz
HIS paper is an int.rodu. ction to a study of what 4,000 Israelis
had to say about their leisure, culture, and communication.
In a national survey conducted during the spring of 1970, we
gathered data on a large variety of cultural activities.' With respect to
each ofthem, an effort was made to measure both supply and demand.
Thus, we know-for cultural events taking place outside the homewhich events were advertised where, and we know who attends which
activities. Likewise, we studied the cultural activities that take place
inside the home, paying particular attention to the effect of the introduction of television, and to the fate of the book_the newest and oldest
media in Israel. We try to do this within two broader contexts. One is
behavioural: using the method of time-budget analysis, we have reconstructed the way in which Israelis invest time, that most scarce of
human resources, over the 24-hour period of a weekday, a Friday, and a
Saturday. The other context is that of attitudes and values: we discuss
the functions of cultural activities and communications within the
framework of attitudes towards work, leisure, the Sabbath, and holidays,
and more generally, in terms of the social and psychological 'needs'
that are experienced as salient by Israeli Jews, in their several social
roles.
Since facts never speak for themselves, we sought to find a way of
presenting this huge array of detailed data as a meaningful whole.
Three quite different approaches suggested themselves, of which we
rejected two and adopted the third.

T

Three approaches to ordering the data
One approach would have been to report on Israel as a small state
with modest but essentially modern patterns ofleisure and culture. We
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can demonstrate that Israelis are not very different from the British, for'
example, in the proportion of the population who are outside their,
homes on a weekday evening, or in the number of books they read; and
not so different from the French in the time they spend caring for child-,
reno A good case can be made for the contention that modern societies
are becoming homogeneous in their patterns of spending leisure, and
that Israel-for all its ostensible difference-is moving in the same
,
general direction. 2
Another way in which these findings might have been summed up is:
in terms of changes which are believed by some to be taking place in:
Israeli society today. Thus, it has become routine for journalists, some'
of whom are sensitive observers, to find materialism and pleasureseeking on the increase in Israel; they suggest that officials and business;
men are more corruptible than before; they find more aimlessness and'
crime; they say tension among ethnic groups is increasing; they argue
that there is a desensitizing to human suffering; and they find that the
interdependence of the Jewish people is a matter of decreasing concern
to young Israelis. 3
We have rejected both those approaches. The first seems to us
excessively behaviouristic and too matter-of-fact; it ignores nothing
less than the long saga from which Israel arose, the short and dramatic
history of its nation-building, and the imprint of both of these-:
Judaism and Zionism-upon its culture. To say, in behaviouristic'
zeal, that it resembles other small European states is to ignore its
idiosyncratic meaning: where it has come from, what it is about, and '.
the choices that lie before it.4
We have rejected the second approach because, while it has time;
perspective and is concerned with values, it is too near-sighted. It is:
based on a too facile romanticization of the recent past, very selectively! '
recalled. It is based on the behaviour of very small groups and onl
sensational cases. Perhaps some of these indictments are correct. Indeed,:
our own data do give some support-though far less dramatically-to!
some of the allegations; for example, we find that Israeli youth are,
somewhat less convinced than their parents of the mutual dependence:
of the Jews in Israel and abroad. But this is a far cry from the radical i
changes tha,t are alleged, and a finding that is counter-balanced by the i
essential similarity which characterizes the Israel-born generation and 1
its parents even in this matter. Altogether, as we shall argue, we find
very little evidence of a generation gap. Perhaps today's exceptional
and sensational will at some future time prove to be the rule; perhaps
the sensibilities of to day's minorities are portents of those of tomorrow's '
majorities. 5 But for the moment, and in the absence of serious and much- '
needed longitudinal studies oflsraeli values, we demur. We shall be unable to say that we were not warned.
We have chosen a third way. The story in our data, we think, is

6

CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION IN ISRAEL

neither one of small-nation normality nor of drastic demoralization, but
of the transformation and secularization of tradition. Our thesis, in a
word, is tbat the predominant patterns ofleisure and culture in modern
Israel are anchored in a set of traditionalJ ewish values which are undergoing a process of transformation. It might be better to say that these
data describe both the ways in which Israeli society has incorporated
traditional values in its rapid evolution, and the ways in which those
values are transformed in the course of their secularization. 6 Perhaps the
end result will be normality and/or demoralization, but in the meantime, it is important to see and understand the process that is at work.

The concept of secularization
Secularization is presumably one of the attributes of modernization.
Nowadays, however, some observers are not so sure; others would
grant only tbat life has become more compartmentalized, and that
certain institutions are governed by sacred and others by secular,
norms. 7 All agree, however, that the concept has been used in a variety
of ways and merits clarification; one writer has even pleaded for a
moratorium on its use. 8
To apply the concept of secularization to Judaism is even more
problematic because Judaism, from the beginning, was suffused with
secular elements. It is, first of all, a national religion, albeit with a
universalistic God and a universalistic ethic. It is, moreover, preoccupied
with history, making it all the more difficult to decide, for example,
which elements of which holidays are sacred or secular. Indeed, its overall strategy is to sanctify the secular, .not in the sense of mystification
but in the sense of giving" religious significance to the round of everyday
life. It is a religious culture which emphasizes observance and form,
perhaps more than belief. Nevertheless, if the society and values of
modern Israel are viewed against the backdrop of the traditionalJ ewish
society of not so long ago, some meaningful comparisons can be
made.
It is in this sense that we find the concept of secularization applicable
to the situation we want to portray. Sometimes; we refer to the secularization of form but contim;Iity of traditional consciousness-as in the
transformation of the age-old longing for a return to Zion into the
business of irrigating deserts and electing parliaments. 9 Sometimes, we
refer to the secularization of consciousness but continuity of form-as
the re-infusion of nationalistic and naturalistic meaning into religious
holidays. In either case, there appears (at first glance) considerable
continuity with traditional Jewish values. In fact, however, the process
of secular transformation, while preserving external forms or internal
meanings, is sometimes subversive of that which it purports to maintain,lO
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The themes which seem central to this framework are the following:
(I) the traditional collectivity-orientation of the Jewish people, as,
opposed to the primacy of individual self-interest;
(2) the traditional centrality of the nuclear family;
(3) the traditional idea that the content of leisure-and, indeed, the
entire round oflife-is normatively prescribed rather than that one
is free 'to do one's own thing';
,
(4) the traditional conception of 'the chosen people' and its reappearance in Zionist thought as a 'spiritual centre' for Jewish
and humanistic creativity;
(5) the traditional qualities 'of asceticism (sobriety) and realityorientation as opposed to hedonism and free-floating fantasy.
I.

Collectivity-orientation

It is a nice paradox that the establishment of modern nationhood
was probably easier-psychologically speaking-for the Jews than for'
the embryonic nations that were living on their own soil. Jewish
nationalism did not have the difficult task of overcoming loyalties to
village and region that stood in the way of the unification of other
nations. Jewish loyalties always reached beyond the local community to '
regional, national, and international alliances with other Jewish communities everywhere, all of which shared the memory of the collective
national experience in the past and of its promised renewal in the future. '
It was easy to adapt this image to the conceptions of European nationalism.
It hardly needs an elaborate empirical study to establish that the
materialization of this dream is at hand; 'To feel pride that we have a
state' tops a list of 35 personal, social, and other 'needs' presented for:
evaluation to the sample of respondents.!I Similarly, of all the holidays:
about which we enquired, Yom Haatzmaut (Independence Day) is the'
one which holds meaning for everybody-young and old, religious and;
irreligious, educated and uneducated, Western and Oriental immigrants '
-while Yom Kippur, by comparison, is alleged to have 'no meaning for:
me' by 16 per cent of the respondents. Again, the 'readiness to sacrifice
oneself Tor the national ideals'-which was associated in our question
with the traditional concept of kiddush haShem (sanctification of the
Name )-is adjudged one of the most characteristic of contemporary ,
national traits by religious and irreligious alike.
The nation is united not only by the fact of the State and not alone by
the memory of the collective experience oflong ago, but by more recent
experience as well. The Holocaust of European Jewry preoccupies a
majority of the popUlation; the extent of reading on this subject is
widespread, and there is disquiet lest something like it happen again. It
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is true that this concern is more characteristic of older persons and
of Ashkenazim, but it is a matter of no small COncern to younger people
and Oriental immigrants as well.
The feeling of connexion with Jews abroad is strong. The feeling that
those Jews are spiritually dependent upon Israel is shared by all segments of the population. The feeling that Israelis, in turn, are dependent on Diaspora Jewry is also strong, but younger people are less
likely than their parents to agree to that.
Israelis see little difference between their identities as Jews and as
Israelis. Whereas Professor Herman, in Israelis and Jews, finds that
religion is a component of Israeli identity only for religious but not for
irreligious Israelis, the present study finds that the same holds true for
Jewish identity.l2 That is, non-religious Israelis find it possible to maintain their identity as Jews (not just as Israelis) without making room
for religion. For a significant proportion of the population, in other
words, the religious element has been subtracted from both Jewish and
Israeli identities, whereas it is present in both sets of identities for
religious persons. Indeed, it appears that the two sets of identities are
virtually synonymous. For all its contribution to integration of the
society, here are first warnings concerning the consequences of a facile
transformation of the traditional collectivity orientation of the Jewish
people into the typical forms and symbols of nationhood. We shall see
the manifestation of this problem again in the discussion of the transformation of traditional holidays.
We find very little evidence of a generation gap. The young hold
values and attitudes similar to those of their parents-that is, the statistical distribution of the opinions and attitudes and behaviour of youth
with respect to almost any issue is almost exactly like that of the parent
generation." Where the young and their parents differ, each party
knows exactly where the other stands; there is no confusion about the
fact that the parents are somewhat more ascetic and that the young
are more present-oriented and say they have a stronger sense of social
justice!
The lines along which the population in fact divides are educational
and religious. Education is generally much stronger than ethnicity,
with people of different ethnic backgrounds acting and thinking similarly, given similar educational attainments. Of course, 'holding education constant', as we say, is easy to do statistically; but it ought not to
blind us to the fact that the educational gap is still very wide. Religion
stands out as potentially the sharpest dividing line in the society.
Religious people-while concentrated in the lower educational groups
-not only differ in their outlook and behaviour on many things; they
are also more solidary among themselves than is the non-religious population. The educated religious person is in the vanguard in upholding
values and practices which have a bearing on the religious outlook.
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Religious identification, however, does not in any way conflict with
national identification. The religious groups in our sample (some
extremists are under-represented) are, if anything, more Zionist than the
non-religious.
How are these integrative tendencies represented in the institutions
of culture and leisure? For one' thing, people rely very heavily on the
newspaper, on the radio, and on television to feel close to whatis going on.
These are the media of involvement with state and society, and they are
very heavily used for that purpose. The newspaper is the medium par
excellence in this respect. Again, the shared experience of the Holocaust
and the Six-Day War-both actual events and the reporting of themsymbolize the common fate. The reading of books on those two subjects
has cut across all the dividing lines of the society.
Second, we are impressed that internal tourism (the tiyul) is a major
integrating mechanism. There is a very large amount of travelling'
within the country-more than two-thirds of the population have
visited Caesaria, Hebron, Tsfat, and the Negev: three-quarters have'
visited a kibbutz, and half have been to the Israel Museum. Even if
tiyul may not be a Zionist invention (curiously Jacob Katz, in Tradition'
and Crisis, suggests that it was popular even in eastern Europe before
emancipation 14), there seems little doubt that the people meet one:
another on the road and at historical and national sites.
The holidays are also major integrating events. As we shall notebelow, most of them are still very alive not only for religious persons,
but for the irreligious as well.
Finally, there is a strong trend towards homogenization in the con- . ;'
sumption of culture in the country. More explicitly, if one compares a)
person with eight years' schooling in Dimona with a person of like,
education in Tel Aviv, the odds are very high that each will have been.
-to the theatre, to the cinema, on a tiyul, etc., with about the same
frequency. It is also very likely-though we did not investigate this
specifically-that they saw the same films and plays and visited thesame sites. This is quite remarkable in view of the great disparity of
cultural offerings between large and small towns; it does not mean that:
Dimona or similar towns are content; they are not. Their residents
CGmplain of inadequate facilities and 'unsuitable companionship'.
Moreover, the proportion of well-educated people is much smaller in .
the development towns than in Tel Aviv, and one should beware-we
caution again----of generalizations based upon 'holding education con- .
stant'. Nevertheless, the homogeneity of cultural consumption-edu-_
cation being held constant-is remarkable. And, of course, this homo-'
geneity is further abetted by national radio and television broadcasting
and a national press. The two afternoon papers are read by 69 per cent
of the population.
10
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Familism

An equally familiar trait of Jewish civilization is dedication to the
family, and to the extended family as well. The data from this study
shoW that the family is at the centre of the society's conception of itself," The need 'to spend time with my family' is next in importance
. to the pride in having a state.
These are not mere expressions of values or of attitudes. Familism
is expressed in action. Three-quarters of those adults whose parents
are alive visit them at least once a week, and parents report visiting
their married children with equal frequency! 16 Education and social
class make almost no difference here; unlike other societies, a higher
degree of education, if anything, increases the frequency of visits.
One has the impression that Israelis-despite or because of the uprooted character of the society-are very sensitive to familial continuity:
a large majority of the population feel that they have a good idea of
how life was lived in grandfather's house.17
Household duties do not seem to be a heavy burden for Israelis;
familism is not expressed, apparently, in house-cleaning. On the other
hand, the time de\ioted to care for children is high compared with most
other nations. IS
When people are asked to imagine what they would do with an
extra day ofleisure if the five-day working-week came to pass, by far the
most frequent answer is: 'I would spend the time with my family'. That
. a man 'should' so spend most of his leisure time is affirmed by 71 per cent
of the respondents.
How does the family spend its time? What cultural activities bind it
together? Of the mass media, television contributes most to family
solidarity; households spend an average of about two hours around the
television set every night. Television is rather less effective in keeping at
home adolescents and young adults, or those of higher education;
.
Other activities that go on inside the home are more particularized:
reading, hobbies, listening to records, study. Radio listening has also
become a much more private affair since the advent of the transistor
and the introduction of television. All these activities increase with
increased educati6n. Indeed, the culture of the home is primarily a
function of education (whereas the selection of activities outside the
home is governed at least as much by age). The less educated spend more
of their leisure sleeping or resting or looking after their home.
Far more important than television as a focus for family solidarity
are Saturdays and holidays. The Sabbath is the day which families
spend together: it is the day for visiting, for more leisurely meals. For
the religious, it is the day of prayer and rest. For the non-religious, it is a
day for family trips and house-cleaning.
A clear majority of the population want to preserve the quiet,
II
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,

homely character of the Sabbath eve as it exists today in Israel. This holds
equally true for young and old. On the other hand, when asked more
explicitly whether public transport should operate on the Sabbath and
whether theatres, concert halls, and cinemas should be open, they are,
rather less traditional in their response. Still, even here, there is a clea~
differentiation between more 'cultural' activity-such as community
centres and theatres-and the cinema, for example. Far fewer (abouti,
40 per cent) are in favour of opening the cinemas on Friday night. While:
the scriptural definition of the Sabbath is by no means the guiding,
ideal, it is obvious that there is a 'cultural' ideal that is shared by a good'
part of the population. (Only the stoutly irreligious among the well·
educated want a drastic change in the character of the Sabbath eve.),
Once more it should be said that while there are clear signs of cultural'
continuity here, one should not make the mistake of assuming that
no changes are at work: a drive in the family car, or playing chamber
music, or watching television (however cultured the content of those
activities) is not what our forbears had in mind for the Sabbath.
Still another sign of the commitment to family and tradition in
connexion with the Sabbath is in the preference expressed for Friday,
rather than Sunday or another weekday, f01'the second free day of the
desired five-day work-week. The preference for Friday-from the point
of view of the quality of the culture--will have very different conse·
quences, if adopted, from that of a Saturday-Sunday weekend. The
Friday-Saturday weekend implies a day of 'preparation'-as Friday is:
today-for the following Holy Day, while the Saturday..sunday weekend provides for tension-release at the conclusion of the Holy Day.
Saturday night is now the popular night for going out, but there is a
higher risk of anomie and its accompanying malaise if it is to be followed'
by a day which is normatively unstructured. The questions of CI)
whether an extra day? (2) which day?, and (3) what provisions will be
made for cultural activities on the extra day? are major questions for'
cultural policy-makers.
'

3. Normative prescriptions for spending leisure
Traditional Jewish culture, like nature, did not tolerate a vacuum. It
sanctified activities governing the entire round of life--not merely
prayer-time or rites de passage but eating-time, sleepingCtime, and
leisure-time. It is another one of those nice-sounding paradoxes to say'
that the Jews invented leisure (in .the institution of the Sabbath) and
then took it back again (by minute prescriptions on how to spend it).
Indeed, leisure was not left at all to the individual's discretion on weekdays either; normatively, his every moment-and all the more so ifhe
could free himself from work-was to be devoted to sacred study. Like
other norms, this one was not easy to live up to" but people were well
12
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ware of the fact, and they made the attempt. Nor is there reason to

~ink that it was experienced as oppressive; quite the contrary. Morever as with other aspects of Jewish religious strategy, certain things

~hat' people wanted to do-like getting up parties, for example-were
subsumed and legitimated in terms of the halakha in the same way as the
things they had to do-such as eating. Thus parties could be legitimately
given on certain occasions-such as when group-study of a book of the
Talmud was completed, or on certain holidays; then the party became
a mitzva and was not considered mere frivolity organized at the expense
of study.I9 And days off from work (and study) were called holidays,
, and each of them was a legitimation of leisure too.
The modern secular city is at the opposite pole. Its ideal,type, at any
rate, makes available the widest variety of individual choice to suit all
tastes and proclivities. And modern leisure, the dominant voices say, is a
time for individual self-expression.
Israel (like most other countries) is in-between, t!:tough it is probably
on the more traditional side also here. First of all, there is a six-day
working-week-which obviously spares the society the problem of
deciding what to do with a non-normatively prescribed leisure day.
Moreover, in so far as people can foresee how they would spend
another eventual free day, they do not have very radical ideas. Most
would spend more time with their families; some would rest; some would
engage in household duties; others would take trips. The main thrust
of most of these replies is that people would do more of, or better with,
the roles to which they are already committed. Most of the extra leisure
would be spent close to, or inside, the home. It is interesting that reading
is .ahead of any of the arts or the media in the list of things people say
they would do with more time.
The 'need for rest appears to be particularly acute for some elements
of the population: the working woman, first of all; then people employed
in commerce, workers in building, in industry, and in service occu'pations. They are all tired; and want a five-day week. Agricultural
workers are tired too, but they are not enthusiastic about a shortened
week since they would not benefit much from' it and might only feel
deprived when others were free. Those with low incomes are also tired,
and are also unenthusiastic (relatively) about a shortened work-weekperhaps because they fear reduced earnings, or perhaps because they
have little idea of the potentialities ofleisure. While these groups are the
more likely to relate leisure and rest, the equation ofleisure and respite
and ofleisure and privacy (or familism) is predominantly emphasized
by almost all groups. It is important to stress that while physical rest
certainly figures in the traditional conception of leisure, so do its sacred
and public aspects: the Sabbath, in the tradition, is a day of 'rest .and
sanctity'; and it is a day of assembly-for festive prayer and study.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the idea of spending leisure in public,
13
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and of devoting it to collective rather than private pursuits, also underlies the concept of political participation in a democracy. It is not only
Jewish ideals that require the normative and public use of leisure for!
their fulfilment. But the trend, overall, is towards privatization.
The preference for normatively prescribed leisure rather than for doyour-own-thing leisure is shown in the attitudes ofIsraelis towards public
holidays. The traditional holidays, in general, continue to have meaning
for persons who are not religious. Unlike New Year's Eve or the First of
May, for example, the Holy Days of Purim, Passover, Rosh Hashana,
Hanukka-and even Shavuot or Lag Ba-omer-have retained their
meaningfulness for most people. As in the case of the Sabbath, these are,
not the original meanings: the latter have been somewhat transformed:
by elevating familial, historical, natural, and other aspects of the
holidays to primary positions. Thus Passover becomes a holiday whose,
primary meaning for many is to provide a feeling of connexion with past
generations and with history, while Shavuot connects them to changing'
seasons, and so on. They might have answered (as some in fact did) that
the holiday had no meaning for them; or that it was a day for rest or for'
doing what they pleased; but they did not so answer. On the other hand,'
as many as ,6 per cent said that Yom Kippur had 'no meaning for me':
-probably because it is incapable ofundergoing secular transformation;,
it is not a day on which one can go out for a picnic, or even celebrate:
national or social emancipation. It is a Holy Day for which Jewish
tradition provides no other alternative to personal confrontation with,
God.
To a certain degree, unprescribed leisure time is made available to:
young people. They go out often, and engage in a variety of activities
involving friends, the cinema, and light entertainment. Their going out
is probably more aimless than the outings of their elders. Even in the
case of young people, however, there is an important need to feel that
leisure is being spent constructively.
But what of the classic prescription to employ leisure time for study?
Here again, we have an example of the secular transformation of a
traditional concept. Relatively to other countries, Israelis spend more of
their leisure-time reading books. Compared with the countries of West-:
ern Europe, a larger proportion of Israelis read at least one book last,
year, and more are 'active readers' (eight books or more per year). The
proportion of 'active readers' among all readers is about as high as in'
England and the Scandinavian countries, and is somewhat higher.
when looked at as a proportion of the population as a whole. 20
'
Perhaps, therefore, the Israelis still deserve the title of the People of
the Book (an appellation given to Jews and Christians by dIe Prophet:
Muhammad). Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between the:
classical conception of the People of the Book and the secular transfor- '
mation of that concept.

'4

CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION IN ISRAEL

'The traditional idea of the Book is that an entire people is simultanDusly-indeed, almost continuously-occupied with the same set of
eymbols and metaphors in terms of which their society and their per~eption of th: world is .organized. The Book is t~e source of rules, and
the constitutIOn by whIch all members-leaders mcluded-are bound.
It is an ongoing collective creation, to which each generation contributes. The secular transformation of the concept, People of the Book, is
people of books, or people of reading; something quite different, obviously. There is nothing shared about the experience any more. Reading
is now a private experience and everybody is reading a different book.
'There is no little irony in the fact that something of the collective
experience w~!ch once der!ve.dfrom the Book.is now to be. had f;om
viewing televlSlon, for a maJonty of the populatIOn spend theIr evemngs
tuned to Israel's one channel. In this sense, television is more like the
original conception of the Book than are books! But 'Mission Impossible'
is no match for Genesis.

4. Chosenness
Book-reading relates, in turn, to the conception of a 'spiritual centre',
which is a modem transformation of the concept of 'chosenness'. When
asked, 'Do you think Israel should be more actively engaged in culture
and learning than other nations?' , 70 per cent said yes. There is some
reason to believe that they mean it. Not only are there more readers
than in other countries, but there are also more people who study (as
many as a third study regularly-on their own, or with teachers). They
express a strong interest in the possibility of formal study-and not
necessarily for credit or degrees. They say that radio and television
might be used~ for this purpose, even at the expense of prime-time
programming. Indeed, judging from the response to this proposal, if
television were to devote one night a week to courses in adult education,
there is a good likelihood that the new programme would be well
received. But the emphasis of adults is not on instrumental careeroriented learning; it is on learning for learning's sake. People say they
want that: why not believe them?
The argument that adult education via television requires another
channel because the present one is 'full', is based on the assumption
that 'Family Affair' and 'Bewitched' and 'The Saint' are the kinds
of programme people will not do without-indeed, they say they are
satisfied with them~but they do not want more ofthem. What they do
want more of, however, is home-made Israeli programmes-in preference to the technically superior imported ones. And for the same reason
they are enthl.lsiastic about Israeli-made films: the loyalty to the
Hebrew-speaking cinema is remarkably high.
That is not the case, however, for original Hebrew books. While
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_time spent at work or at leisure, the former out-distanced the latter
by far-although the proportion answering that 'both' work and leisure
were important is higher still. Altogether, the characterization of
Israeli society as 'puritan' seems not too far off the mark. On the other
hand, the high percentage who feel that luck is a major component of
success, and the high proportion of participation in the several national
lotteries argue in another direction. Nor is high productivity or pride in
work-attributes which were not explicitly examined by us-especially
conspicuous to the observer of this society, Still, orientation to reality
and a general sense of sobriety and of purpose appear to be.important
basic values.

6. Conclusion
The threads of continuity are still clearly visible in Israeli culture.
The Jewish values of collectivity-orientation, familism, learning, sense
of purpose, and orientation to reality are all much in evidence. Some
of these values seem to have remained intact. Others are undergoing
transformation. Thus, the People of the Book have become the people of
reading; the religious festival is transformed in meaning; ethnicity and
national identification appear to be dominating religious integration.
In all this, the generation gap does not seem much in evidencealthough there are some differences. The young (18-25 years old in our
study) feel less dependent on DiasporaJewry; their thoughts turn less
often to the Holocaust; they seek more immediate gratification as
compared with the future-orientation of their parents; they may be
. somewhat less religious. But on the whole they are not very much
different-and will be even less so, one suspects, when they grow older.
The big question is whether the transformation will prfserve any
semblance of the uniqueness of traditional Jewish culture. What will
become of Yom Kippur, if secular Jews find difficulty in investing it
with a transformed meaning? What will become of religious holidays
that have-once again-returned to nature, family, and nation (whence
they arose)? What will happen to the tradition of learning if it is
oriented towards individualistic rather than collective experience, and
to career rather than .to learning for its own sake? Will the sense of
peoplehood become standardized patriotism? Will chosenness become
mere chauvinism? These are some of the major questions raised by this
study.
.
Another set of problems is concerned with artistic and cultural
creativity- in a small nation" bent on reviving an ancient culture in a
modern world. Will the satellite leave room for indigenous expression
On the airwaves? Will the book written locally and in Hebrew hold its
own against the avalanche of translated foreign works? Will the nascent
Israeli film have a chance against the sub-titled films of Hollywood?

"
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Indeed, will traditional Holy Days survive the electronic transmission of
other people's celebrations? Will Judaism survive Zionism?
All these matters require policy decisions. There is no use evading the
fact that the Government is actively involved in cultural policy: it
subsidizes some theatres; it gives tax rebates to some films; it organizes
the Independence Day celebrations; it does not concern itself with the
high cost of books; it makes the public performance of Richard Strauss
very difficult; and so on. Cultural policy, however, is rarely made explicit. The Ministry of Education and Culture is only now beginning to,
live up to the latter part of its name. Public discussion of the issues de- .
serves to be encouraged.
At the same time, the education of the consumer of culture needs to be
cultivated. Learning how to view a television programme, or how to
read a newspaper is one aspect of this; pondering the contemporary
meaning of traditional holidays is another. Contemplating how-or
whether-to give expression to the national quest for moral purpose is
still another. Adult education-in its broadest sense-is the challenge
of Israeli culture. It is, potentially, also the most important link with the
kind of continuing education which was the most distinctive aspect of .
.traditional Jewish culture. Thought and resources must be made'
available for its cultivation.

NOTES
1 The study on which this paper is hased was commissioned by the late
Zalrn.an kanne, when Minister of Education and Culture; it was carried out
jointly by the Communications Institute of the Hebrew University and the
Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. Members of the research group
were Elihu Katz and Michael Gurevitch (co-directors), and Hanna Adoni,
Gila Brand, Oved Cohen, Hadassah Haas, and Leah Isaac. This paper
constitutes the second of two introductory chapters to the report on the study
by Katz and Gurevitch which is being published by :Faber and Faber
(London) and, to the volume in Hebrew, by Am Oved (Tel Aviv). Empirical

data referred to here are documented in those works. The present version of

the paper was prepared for presentation at the Symposium on 'Israel Society'
organized by the Institute ofJewish Affairs in London, 18 March 1973, and
benefited from the discussion of participants and panellists. It was written
while I was Simon Research Fellow at the University of Manchester.
2

For a persuasive argument that students of leisure focus too much on

national and sub-group differences and too little on the similar rhythms of
modern societies, see Kenneth Roberts, L8isure, London, 1970.
3 In fact, the collection of our data pre-dates much of this criticism. This is
of some import in as much as it is the relative decline in concern over security
problems which is blamed for some of these alleged changes. This is another
possible reason why our data do not reflect them (or why we did not focus on
them as directly as we might have done, if our study were being designed
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day). It is certainly true that a decline in the preoccupation with security

b~ing5 the domestic proble~s of social a,nd economic re~ati~ns to the fore;,

Israel w~ll have to grapple wIth these. It IS also true that In CIrcumstances of
stensible calm the newspapers have more room, and more time, to put these
o
.,
d
roblems on SOcIety sagen a.
p 4 This is the objection to all purely behavioural analysis, of course, whether
ofIGnsey-typestudies of human sexual behaviour or of behavioural studies of
the uses of time where one kind of act is equated with another so long as they
consume the same amount of time. There is much to be learned from such
data, however; indeed, as noted above, a considerable part of our own
analysis is based on such material. But, clearly, they are not 'sufficient'.
5 Survey research, based on random sampling, gives every respondent an
equal vote .. It is now well known that radical social change is not usually
accomplished by a majority vote. Professor S. J. Gould of Nottingham
University, in a private conversation after the Symposium, suggested that our
analysis reminded him of sociological analyses of American society on _the
eve of the violent racial, urban, and student upheavals of the 1960s. Even if
such a fate is in store for Israel, it is important to say that, even today, as the
smoke is dying down, the vast majority of the American people are not very
different from what they were, nor did the much..vaunted generation gap
affect more than only a fraction of the college-educated youth. But this is
not to gainsay the importarice of the social crisis in America. Methodologically, it suggests that several parallel lines of social inquiry must be carried
out at the same time, and with different populations, and that each of these
.
lines of investigation niust be continued over time.
6 We are sidestepping the question of how Israeli culture and leisure are
different from those of Jewish communities in the Diaspora. Clearly, the
process of secularizati0rt in Judaism did not begin with Israel, or even
with Zionism. And the tension between ethnicity and religion has mark~d
the history of modern Jewish thought not only for the irreligious but for
the religious aswell; indeed, this is part of what Reform Judaism was (is?)
all about: We ask forgiveness of those who would have liked us-to face this
larger question head on. We hope, none the less, that this portrait ofIsrael will
contribute to the-larger discussion, in which the role of Israel-as the Jewish
state-features so prominently.
'l See, for example, Andrew Greeley, The Denominational Society, New York,
1972.
8 David Martin, The Religious and the Secular, London, 1969. See especially
Chapter I, 'Towards -Eliminating the Concept of Secularisation', and
Chapter 4, 'Secularisation: The Range of Meaning'.
9 The distinction b~t\.veen secularization of social structure and of consciousness is Peter Berger's in The New Reality of Religion, London, 1968. In
discussing 'Israelite religion', Berger tends to see the Jews as demystifiers of
primitive religions ariel hence as having a secularizing influence from the
beginning. Our outlook is rather different, as noted above.
10 Here we disagree with writers like Andrew Greeley who argue that
secularization is not rampant in modern society and that the sacred and the
traditional are holding their own, at least as well as in earlier societies. For
the case WE; reported, the evidence of the continuity of tradition is there to be
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seen; indeed, that is the point of this paper. But the process of secularization
and its ultimate subversion of the sacred seems equally apparent. One can
remember what Passover used to be like in one's parents' home, and, re~
enacting its forms, infuse it with secular -meanings. But even if the result can
be institutionalized, one cannot transmit this process to another generation:
that is the problem.
11 These 'needs" or goals or values are derived from the literature on the
functions of mass communications for self and society, supplemented by
'needs' w.hich seemed to us particularly characteristic of the Israeli scene,
Respondents were asked to say, with respect to each, how ~important' it
-was.
12 Simon Herman, Israelis and Jews, New York, I970 '
13 Here we differ with Amos Elon, The Israelis: Founders and Sons, New
York, I97I. We did not explore attitudes to the stereotype of the Diaspora :
Jew, though the generation gap in this respect might be more likely to exist
between our first generation and their parents rather than with their children.
As for attitudes to Arabs, we find that' the important differences are far
better explained by education than age: the,_ better educated, at any age, are'
more open to friendship with Arabs. Further support for the absence of a
conspicuous generation gap can be found:, the last elections revealed no'
differences in the voting patterns of younger and older voters.
14 Jacob Katz, ,Tradition and Crisis, -New York, I9 6 1. 15 This use of 'centre' is more than rhetorical. Using a technique for the
mapping of matrices of inter-correlations (the Guttman-Lingoes method of
Smallest Space Analysis), we find family at the centre of the map. This
means, essentially, that the magnitude of the correlations between commitment to family and a large variety of otherWise disparate values is equally
high.
16 Cf. Bert Adams, Kinship in an Urban Setting, Chicago, 1967, and Michael
"young and Peter Wilmott, Fa(niiYand KJnshipiw East London, London,
Penguin edn., I968. A recomputation of the figures in these volumes on the
fr~quency of meetings between adult ,'pa'reri~s':-and' married children suggests
thatthe Israeli rate is very high, even when compared with the small Southern
city studied by Adams or the family-liased networks studied by Young and
Wilmott.
.
17 This is one of the points at which a comparison between second- and
third-generation Israelis and their cousins in the United States might be
very revealing. One has the impression that -immigrants to America did not
give their children much of a picture of what life was like in their parents'
home in eastern Europe, whereas Israelis of- the _-same origin have a clearer
picture. However, this is just a guess-and eminently-worth studying, though
the picture grows cloudier with each new fiddl~r on each romantic roof.
, 18 References to the comparative use of tiine· are all based on Alexander
Szalai, ed., The Use qf Time, The Hague, '97 2 •
19 See Jacob Katz, op. cit., for a discussion of such phenomena.
,,20 Statistics on books and rea,ding abo:und; hut they are not always easily
comparable, being based on differing definitions and methods of research.
Data in the table below are from the Reader's Digest Association, Survey of
Europe Today, London, '970, pp. 120-21;: they are from specially com20.

CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION IN ISRAEL
missioned sample surveys in each of the countries listed, and the methods
employed were similar to Ours. For further details em reading in Israel, see
Elihu Katz and Hanna Adoni, 'Function of the Book for Society and Self', in
Diogenes (forthcoming) and in Kalma Yaron, ed., Lifelong Education in Israel,
Association for Adult Education, Jerusalem 1972, as well as a Master~s;_thesis
by Mrs. Adoni submitted to the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew
University, '972 (in Hebrew).

Readers of books and readers of more than 8 books. a year
in Israel and in European countries
%

the readers if more
than 8 books a year

who read one
book in the last
year

Israel
France
England
Italy
'West Germany·
Switzerland
Austria
Denmark
Holland
Belgium
Portugal

77
. 56
63
24
5'
69
54
67
66
4'
28

% among the
entire population

% o/all

42
33
39

55
59
6,
38

9

17
23
'4
39
35
21
'5

readers

32 ..

33
26
58
53
49
53

21 One of the great 'natural resources' of first-generation Israelis (their
multi-linguality) is not being passed on to the next generation.
22 This psychological struggle, and particularly the anguish over making
war, is one of the great problems of Israeli intellectuals. This echoes Amos
Elon's discussion, op. cit.
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